Introduction 1
This chapter is concerned with Hong Kong's exchange rate regime as it has functioned from 1983 to the present day. The regime has variously been described as a link, a peg, and a currency board. For convenience, this paper takes these terms to be synonymous, and therefore elects to call the regime a currency board throughout the period. It is acknowledged, however, that some purists would argue that the regime has not always fulfilled all necessary conditions to be classified as such. What is incontrovertible, from the evidence, is that the arrangements, however they may be described, have been remarkably successful in their primary objective of keeping the exchange rate stable at around US$1 = HK$7.80. Since July 1984, the rate has never diverged from 7.80 by more than 1%.
The focus of the chapter is the question of 'rules versus discretion'. In essence, how much of the observed exchange rate stability has been the result of the prevailing currency board rules themselves (as amended from time to time by the authorities, whether or not on a strictly statutory basis) and the automatic adjustment processes arising from them; can only serve to undermine monetary stability, and so forth. Greenwood, for instance, writing in 1988, just after the authorities had acquired the means to influence the liquidity of the banking system, said: 'Any shift from a system of rules to a system of discretionary intervention must be regarded with circumspection'; and, almost a year later:'…since July 1988 the Exchange Fund has been operating more like a central bank than a passive colonial currency board.' Then, commenting on the announcement of a programme of issuing Exchange Fund bills he said:
It seems likely that Hong Kong will move to a system of regular discretionary intervention in the domestic money market and/or in the foreign exchange market. Once this is accomplished later this year it will no longer be possible to claim that Hong Kong does not have a central bank. Judged strictly from the standpoint of the conduct of monetary policy, this development will take Hong Kong even further down the path towards full-scale central banking.
3
Milton Friedman contributed to this debate when, at a conference in 1993 to mark the tenth anniversary of the HKD link and the establishment of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, he made a thinly veiled criticism of the creation of an institution looking more like a central bank than a currency board. 4 More recently, Hanke declared that the HKMA was not a currency board, in a tone suggesting that it was a sin not to be one. 5 In fact, no-one ever claimed that the HKMA was itself a currency board; the important feature of Hong Kong's arrangement is that the HKMA operates a currency board regime within a wider set of functions and responsibilities. These wider duties may, taken altogether, indeed brand the HKMA institutionally as a central bank, but that does not necessarily undermine its discrete currency board function.
Prompted by such considerations, the next section provides a discussion of the concept of a currency board and the delineation of rules from discretion. Section 3 notes briefly the evolution of the institutional infrastructure within which monetary policy operates. Section 4 divides the period 1983-2006 into five sub-periods, each covering a slightly different regime phase. For each sub-period it describes the significant additions or changes to the monetary regime which are relevant to the rules-versus-discretion debate and which characterise the phase, before reviewing the behaviour of the exchange rate and the
